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Abstract—Security and service protection against cyber at-
tacks remain among the primary challenges for virtualized, multi-
tenant Data Centres (DCs), for reasons that vary from lack of
resource isolation to the monolithic nature of legacy middleboxes.
Although security is currently considered a property of the
underlying infrastructure, diverse services require protection
against different threats and at timescales which are on par with
those of service deployment and elastic resource provisioning. We
address the resource allocation problem of deploying customised
security services over a virtualized, multi-tenant DC. We formu-
late the problem in Integral Linear Programming (ILP) as an
instance of the NP-hard variable size variable cost bin packing
problem with the objective of maximising the residual resources
after allocation. We propose a modified version of the Best Fit
Decreasing algorithm (BFD) to solve the problem in polynomial
time and we show that BFD optimises the objective function up
to 80% more than other algorithms.
Keywords—Data Centers, security virtualization, resource-
aware allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
Security in DCs is deployed as a sequence of in-network
middleboxes such as firewalls and Intrusion Detection and Pre-
vention Systems (IDS/IPS). To mitigate the problems of legacy
hardware-based middleboxes such as, e.g., expensiveness, ven-
dor lock-in, deployment inflexibility, and lack of resource
scalability [1], virtualized middleboxes have emerged such as
WAN optimizers [2] and IDPS systems [3], [4]). Moreover,
as ICT is moving to the Cloud, more in-the-cloud network
services are offered by Cloud Services Providers or third
party companies [5]. Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
is the technology used to deploy virtualized middleboxes as
network functions (NFs). For security services, the flexibility
of Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs) deployment and
scaling will offer a rapid response such as deploying additional
modules that raises the efficiency of the system to handle
attacks and changes in traffic and infrastructure [6].
However, the inefficient management of in-cloud network
functions can itself cause performance degradation and/or
reduce turnover. For example, where the functions will be
deployed and how this will effect the DC routing makes
a difference, since such decisions highly affect the network
performance and can result in resource wastage or cause
bottlenecks [5]. Our work focuses on the efficient allocation
of security services over multi-tenant virtualized DCs. A pool
of security modules such as, e.g, firewalls, IDS/IPS, DDoS
mitigation tools, and DPI engines, are available for tenants to
request. Requested modules will be deployed in the DC as
virtualized network functions where they can process traffic
destined to the requesting tenant. The modules are offered on a
per tenant basis to provide customised security, for example, an
end-user will require basic security services while commercial
or critical services can request more advanced service in the
form of, e.g., multiple modules to ensure higher availability.
In this paper, we address the problem of allocation of
different security modules over a virtualized DC infrastructure
using a resource-aware placement methodology. Our contribu-
tions include the classification of the security modules based
on the granularity of traffic. The ILP formalisation of the
security function placement as an instance of the NP-hard
bin packing optimisation problem with an objective function
based on maximising residual resources. For a polynomial time
solution, a modified version of the Best-Fit Decreasing (BFD)
greedy algorithm is designed. Finally, through a comparative
assessment, we demonstrate that BFD optimises the residual
resources when compared to other algorithms.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II discusses related work, and Section III introduces the prob-
lem of security modules placement. Section IV formalises the
problem in ILP form and, in Section V, we adopt a modified
version of the BFD algorithm and provide a performance and
comparative assessment against different greedy algorithms in
Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
As the use of virtualized middleboxes becomes more
widespread, research is focusing on the different aspects of
managing in-network functions in virtualized environments
[5], [7]–[9]. Yet only a few consider the distinct requirements
and constraints related to security functions such as, e.g., the
granularity of the processed traffic. Gamber et al. [5] suggest a
network-aware orchestration layer for virtualized middleboxes.
It uses horizontal scaling to leverage performance, however, it
only considers functions that process traffic at the flow level.
The authors in [10], address the allocation of security services
in virtualized environments and discuss their challenges. They
model the allocation problem for ISP networks to minimise
the cost of operators as a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) problem but no results for the implementation are
reported.
What distinguishes our work from previous research in
the management of virtualized services is that it explicitly
addresses the requirements and constraints of security ser-
vices such as traffic constraints which impose a restriction
on allocation. While most previous work propose to place
NFs on DC servers [5], [7], [11], the proposed architecture
reduces the overhead of having to resort to non-shortest-path
routing by deploying the security modules on the actual traffic
path. Moreover, virtualized functions used to be implemented
in a similar fashion to their hardware counterparts, i.e., as
high-speed high-capacity appliances. They process traffic for
different users in the network within their capacity. However, in
multi-tenant environments where services are offered on a per-
tenant basis, sharing security functions among different tenants
will increase the complexity of managing them. Furthermore,
specific security functionality that is based on building a
behavioural model for traffic such as, e.g., anomaly detection
modules, cannot be shared since each tenant will have a
different normal behavioural model. Besides, tenants should be
allowed to configure their security functions themselves. Yet,
if the same binaries are shared among different tenants, then
access control becomes cumbersome and there are real risks
for illegitimate access that can cause security policy violations.
Our work reduces the complexity and the security risks of
deploying shared modules by adopting non-sharing strategy.
III. SECURITY MANAGEMENT
In multi-tenant virtualized DCs, users run different applica-
tions, each with different security requirements. For instance, a
typical web server may require security modules to detect and
mitigate HTTP flood attacks and SQL injections, while critical
servers may require a firewall, IDS and/or DPI to guarantee
high availability and data integrity. We focus on orchestrating
security services in multi-tenant virtualized DCs where they
are offered as modules that are allocated throughout the infras-
tructure to process the required traffic. The modules are offered
on a per-tenant basis and each request will result in deploying a
module to process flows of the requesting tenant. A placement
algorithm is responsible for selecting allocations for security
requests to satisfy the request requirements and constraints,
and maintain an efficient usage of the DC resources. Such
arrangement offers the customisation to fulfil diverse tenants
needs for different security services and levels of protection,
and reduce the complexity of having to manage shared security
modules.
A. Architecture
A multi-rooted tree is one of the most common virtualized
DC network architectures [12]. For example, a 𝑘=4 fat-tree
topology shown in Figure 1 with three layers of switches
(ToR, aggregation, and core). We assume routing is flow-
based Equal Cost Multiple Path (ECMP) [13], where a flow
is identified by the typical five-tuple (source and destination
IP address, source and destination transport layer ports, and
IP PROTO type), and flows are distributed over equal cost
links. To reduce the detour length of the path that traffic
has to take to pass through a security function, our approach
allocates security modules to points collocated with switches
at all layers. Traffic is rerouted from switches to the security
function and back as shown in Figure 1. While it is common to
deploy network functions at host VMs, our approach reduces
the overhead imposed by the security system by deploying
the security function on the actual traffic path and avoid
redirecting traffic. The security function abstraction can be
implemented as a distinct namespace within a software switch
or on a separate, virtualized commodity x86 architecture that
physically connects to a traffic-forwarding switch.
B. Placement of Security Modules
The placement problem is selecting an allocation for the
requested module that satisfies the tenant request for a se-
curity service. The placement must ensure that the module
requirements and constraints are satisfied. For the security
function, the traffic constraints and the resource requirements
are considered in the selection process.
1) Traffic Constraints: Traffic can be processed at different
levels such as per-packet, per-flow, or flow-aggregate. Each
level provides protection against different types of security
vulnerabilities. For example, per-packet or per-flow process-
ing cannot detect threats that span multiple flows such as,
e.g., DDoS flooding. We classify security functions to two
classes based on how traffic is processed to detect threats and
subsequently the granularity of the traffic required for each.
This classification will determine the traffic constraints of the
modules and help the placement algorithm select the location
where a security function can accurately capture the required
traffic.
The Stateless class represents modules that process traffic
at the individual flow or packet level. The typical operation of
a module of this class is to match patterns of the packet or
flow specification against a set of signatures/access lists and
take action on finding a match, e.g., block, pass, alert and/or
log. Therefore, detection or mitigation depends on the state
of a single packet or flow. Since this packet/flow matching
on a given signature is done independently at different links,
replicated instances of this class can be distributed across
multiple network locations where traffic destined to a tenant
is being split. Examples of this equivalence class include
Access Control List (ACL)-based stateless firewalls that eval-
uate packet contents statically; firewalls that keep track of
the bidirectional state of network connections [14]; signature-
based IDS and DPI such as, e.g., Snort [3] and Suricata [4].
The Stateful class includes security modules that process
traffic to extract anomalies based on a coarser granularity
than the stateless class such as, e.g., flow-aggregation. They
use techniques based on different features of traffic such as,
e.g., changes in traffic volume (Change Point Detection [15]),
deviations in a given traffic feature distribution (Entropy,
Histograms, etc. [16]), or use more complex machine learn-
ing techniques. They mine information from flow aggregate
features to construct a model of normal behaviour and detect
anomalies based on deviations from such normality. Therefore,
a security module of this class cannot be duplicated and the
intended monitored flows must all be steered to one instance
of this type to capture an accurate behaviour model.
The traffic constraints of a security module will limit the
available locations where the required traffic granularity is
satisfied. For example, in a three-tier architecture, all traf-
fic destined to a server is routed through the ToR switch
connecting the server to the DC. Hence, modules can be
deployed at this layer as a single instance satisfying all traffic
granularity levels. While at higher layers of the architecture,
traffic destined to a tenant traverses multiple links at each
level and only a fraction of the flows is observed at each
parent switch. Therefore, stateless class modules can employ
replicated instances across the parent switches of the requested
tenants at certain level as long as the entire traffic is monitored.
On the other hand, stateful class modules need to coordinate
between duplicate instances to accurately capture the traffic
features, otherwise traffic would need to be rerouted through
a single switch where a single instance of the security module
would be deployed.
2) Resource Requirements: Locations available to host
software security modules/binaries have a predefined capacity
of computing resources to allocate. This capacity is defined by
a resource vector (CPU, RAM, I/O bandwidth, Storage). Each
request from a tenant has a similar vector of the expected
required resources which is the estimation of the amount of
resources the modules will consume to process the requesting
tenant traffic. However, computing the resources required by
a security module is a complex process since, for example, it
involves estimating the highly bursty temporal traffic charac-
teristics of the corresponding tenant that have a major impact
on the amount of the required resources.
To determine how to estimate the resources required for a
security module request, we considered the widely-used IDS
Snort as a case-study. Snort captures and inspects packets to
detect malicious activities through DPI on the packet payload
against attacks signatures represented as a rule set. While
many traffic features affect resource consumption such as, e.g.,
traffic load, traffic type, packet size, present or absence of
attack, number of packet fragmentation [17]–[19] , yet traffic
intensity is the main factor to consider for initial deployment.
Thus, each security module in the pool will be associated
with two resource vectors that represent a baseline requirement
(resources required for initial deployment of the module) and
a traffic requirement associated with each traffic type (e.g.
TCP, HTTP, mixed traffic,etc.), and represents the estimated
amount of resources required to process a unit of traffic of this
type. Besides, tenants associate their requests with an expected
rate(s) for each traffic type(s) to be processed. The placement
must ensure satisfying the resource requirements of the request
such as the resources available at the chosen location(s) must
be greater than or equal to the sum of the baseline and traffic
resource required by the requested module.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Problem Rationale
The placement of security modules is a resource allocation
problem, where modules requested by tenants in virtualized
DCs are allocated in a set of distributed locations each with
limited capacity. We focus on the initial placement of the
two security equivalence classes introduced in section III. To
satisfy the traffic constraints, the stateless class modules will
independently duplicate over links in case of allocations where
traffic is distributed over multiple links. The statefull class
modules for simplicity will be allocated to ToR switches where
they can capture all traffic flows destined to the requested
tenant. For example, in the 𝑘=4 fat-tree shown in Figure 1,
a stateless class module deployed for a tenant in server 8 (in
Fig. 1. locations rearrangement for ILP in 𝑘=4 Fat-Tree DC
grey) has three available locations (shown in blue blocks) that
satisfy the traffic constraints where each allocation will have
redundant instances in each switch. on the contrary, a statefull
module will be directly deployed at the corresponding ToR
switch. When more than one allocations satisfy the resource
requirements and traffic constraints of a request, the one that
optimises the placement objective will be selected. We design
the placement algorithm to achieve maximum allocation ratio
using minimum amount of resources. We accomplish that
with two objectives, the first objective is to maximise the
resources placement ratio to achieve maximum allocation ratio
of resources. The second objective is to maximise the residual
resources of the framework which represent the spare resources
after the placement has been completed.
B. Integer Linear Program (ILP) Formulation
The placement of security modules is an instance of a
variable cost – variable size bin packing problem (VSBPP) [20]
where switches can be represented as bins, the security mod-
ules are the items, bin size is the resource capacity of the
switches, and the price is the resource consumption of modules
to be allocated. To represent the problem as VSBPP in ILP
form, every request must be allocated to only one location.
Therefore, switches are rearranged in a new location schema
as the blocks shown in Figure 1. The new locations schema
combines switches with distributed traffic to one location.
Consequently, the number of locations in the structure will be
changed, for instance in the 𝑘=4 fat-tree shown in Figure 1,
the number of locations will be reduced to 13 instead of 20.
Besides, locations combining more than one switch will have
a capacity equal to the sum of the capacity of the combined
switches. Also, the cost of allocating a module to a combined
location will be equal the cost of duplicating the module across
the switches in the new location. For example, server 8 will
have three valid locations to allocate modules that are shown
in blue blocks. The ToR blue block location with a total cost
equal the cost of the deployment of one instance. The second
location will be the blue block in the aggregation level with
the cost of two instances, and the third location in the core
level will have a cost of four instances deployment.
The formulation of problem is as follows: Let the overall
framework include a set of 𝑞 requests 𝑄= {𝑟1, 𝑟2, ....𝑟𝑞} with
each request 𝑟 representing a module requested by a tenant, a
set of 𝑝 locations 𝐿= {𝑙1, 𝑙2, ....𝑙𝑝}, each with attribute 𝑙.𝑠 as
the resources’ capacity at location 𝑙. A matrix 𝑣 of size 𝑝x𝑞
representing the traffic constraint where 𝑣𝑟,𝑙 = 1 if location 𝑙
can satisfy request 𝑟; 0 otherwise. For instance, for the stateful
class, only the ToR level will be valid for allocation. While,
for the stateless class, there are three parent locations that are
valid. To combine the two objectives mentioned earlier, we
use an approach that allows us to represent them as a linear
function to maximise the residual resources of the allocation.
Our approach adds an extra virtual location to the actual
locations with enough capacity to accommodate all requests,
however, the cost will be more than the cost of allocation in the
other real locations. The resource cost of allocating modules
are represented by variable 𝑐 of size 𝑝x𝑞 where 𝑐𝑟,𝑙 represent
the resources required to place request 𝑟 in location 𝑙. After
the placement is complete, all requests allocated to this virtual
location will be considered unallocated requests. The allocation
is represented as a binary variable 𝑥 of size 𝑝x𝑞 where 𝑥𝑟,𝑙=1
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𝑥𝑟,𝑙 ⋅ 𝑐𝑟,𝑙 ≤ 𝑙.𝑠 ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 (2)
𝑥𝑟,𝑙 = 0, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑄, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑟,𝑙 = 0 (3)∑
∀𝑙∈𝐿
𝑥𝑟,𝑙 = 1, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑄 (4)
Note: the objective function of the ILP formulation is
represented in (1) as maximising the residual resources after
the placement. The constraint in (2) represents the locations
capacity constraints which are enforced by the resources
requirements of the problem. The constraint in (3) represents
the location validity for requests which enforce the traffic
constraint of the problem. The constraint in (4) ensures that
each request is allocated to only one location.
V. PLACEMENT METHODOLOGY
As bin-packing problems have been shown to be NP-
hard [21], many heuristic algorithms have been proposed to
solve it. The Best Fit Decreasing (BFD) algorithm is the
most widely applied, since it is proven to use not more than
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9 ⋅ 𝑂𝑃𝑇 + 1 bins, where 𝑂𝑃𝑇 is the number of bins in
an optimal solution [22] within polynomial time [23]. In
BFD, the items are sorted in decreasing order and the sorted
items are allocated such that minimum empty space will be
left after the allocation The BFD algorithm saves resources
by selecting the best fit location. Moreover, The decreasing
order of requests will result in allocating modules with high
resource demand in more efficient locations that will reduce
the total resource consumption and ultimately will result in
accommodating more requests. We have adopted a modified
version of BFD called power-aware best fit decreasing where
virtual machines (VM) are allocated to locations that cause the
least increase in power consumption [20]. We substitute power
consumption of VM placement with resource consumption in
security function placement as the cost function, as illustrated
by the following algorithm:
Input: Set of requests 𝑄, set of locations 𝐿
Output: Set of requests allocated to locations 𝐴
1: 𝐴← ∅ // initialisation
2: 𝑄∗ ← 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑄) // sort request w.r.t. resources
3: for all 𝑟 ∈ 𝑄∗ do
4: for all 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 do
5: if ((𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐴, 𝑟, 𝑙) = TRUE)⋀(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑟, 𝑙) = TRUE))
then
6: 𝑙∗ = argmin𝑙′∈𝐿 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑟, 𝑙′)
7: end if
8: if (𝑙∗ ∕= 0) then




13: return Set of allocated requests 𝐴
The set 𝐴 refers to the set of allocated requests in certain
locations, 𝑄 is set of initial requests, 𝐿 is set of locations.
The function 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑄) sorts the requests from 𝑄 by a de-
creasing order of resources required; 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐴, 𝑟, 𝑙) ensures
the resources required in location 𝑙 in allocation 𝐴 is enough
to accommodate a give request 𝑟; 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑟, 𝑙) constrains
the location to those who satisfy the traffic constraints such
as for a stateful class request 𝑟, only parent location 𝑙 that
is in ToR level is valid, while 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑟, 𝑙) calculates the cost
of allocating the request 𝑟 to location 𝑙. The algorithm sorts
requests and then allocates each request to the Best-Fit (BF)
location. First, it sorts requests by the amount of required
resources to deploy one instance for each in a decreasing order.
Then it allocates the sorted modules one by one by calculating
the cost of placing the module to each valid location. The
algorithm only considers locations with enough resources to
accommodate the module, and finally selects the BF allocation
by selecting the location that causes the minimum increase
in total resource consumption/cost. The proposed resource-
aware BFD algorithm achieves the objectives of maximising
the allocation ratio using the minimum amount of resources.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Performance metrics
To demonstrate the efficiency of the resource allocation
algorithms, we introduce two metrics that represent our objec-
tives presented in Section IV. The first metric is the overall
Placement Ratio (PR), which represents the ratio of allocated
resources out of the total amount of resources requested. For
example, PR=1 will indicate meeting all requests by finding
the allocation that satisfies their constraints, while PR<1
indicates a failure ratio where not all requests are satisfied.
Furthermore, it indicates the utilisation level of resources,
where an efficient algorithm will result in higher amount
of allocated resources. The second metric is the Residual
Resources (RS) of the network, which is the ratio of the spare
resources (after placement) to the total amount of resources
available and is calculated by adding the residual resources at
each location after placement. For a specific PR, RS indicates
the efficiency of resource usage as the ratio of saved resources
after placement.
B. Models Comparison
We compare the proposed BFD algorithm with three re-
source allocation algorithms: First Fit (FF), Best Fit (BF),
and First Fit Decreasing (FFD) [24]. Specifically, in FF, the
(a) Placement Ratio (b) Residual Resources
Fig. 2. Placement Ratio (PR) and Residual Resources (RS) BFD, FFD, BF
and FF algorithms and ILP when 𝑝=20 and 𝑘=8
unordered requests are allocated to the first level that will
fit them. In the BF, the unordered requests are allocated to
the best fit location where the total cost is minimised. In
FFD, the requests are ordered in decreasing order based on
resource consumption, and are allocated to first fit (module
types with high resource consumption allocated first). In BFD,
the requests are ordered the same way as in FFD, and then are
allocated to the best-fit location. In addition, an ILP solution
modelled using the Gurobi optimizer [25] is used as baseline
for comparison.
C. Performance Assessment
Without loss of generality, we assume traffic is uniformly
distributed on all servers and each server represents one tenant.
All switch locations have an equal initial capacity of available
resources to accommodate security modules. Modules are
simulated as different-sized families based on the baseline
resources required by each module which is the minimum
resources to deploy the modules. The families’ sizes are dis-
tributed evenly across the location capacity size. For example,
for 𝑝 = 3, i.e., the number of families is 3, the sizes of the first
family will be a number between 0 and 0.33% of the capacity
of each location, the second family size will be between 33%
and 66%, and the third family size will be between 66% and
100% of the capacity of each location. The resources required
by a request are calculated as shown in Section III.
We simulated the workload as a ratio of resources requested
out of the total resources available to the allocation, and
this percentage is distributed evenly over the tenants where
a tenant can request modules with total resources less than or
equal to its share of the workload. Tenants request modules
at random with maximum one from each family. We have
evaluated the performance the algorithms over simulated 𝑘 ∈
{4, 6, 8, 10, 12} fat-tree DC topologies. We consider resources
as a one-dimensional vector. All results are computed over an
average of 20 runs. We present results of the PR and RS for
the three different experimental scenarios.
The first experiment shows the effect of the workload on the
performance metrics in the case of 𝑝=20 families. The results
of PR and RS metrics for a 𝑘=8 fat-tree are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2(a) shows the objective function placement ratio near 1
for low workloads. While beyond 50% workload, PR starts de-
creasing linearly with the workload, which occurs as a result of
the requested resources starting to exceed resource capacity at
each location. While all algorithms suffer from such reduction,
decreasing-order algorithms (FFD and BFD) show slightly less
(a) Placement Ratio (b) Residual Resources
Fig. 3. Placement Ratio and Residual Resources of BFD algorithm when
𝑝=20 and 𝑘=4, 6, 8, 10, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 12
reduction in PR than BF and FF and overlap with the optimal
ILP solution at higher workloads. This can be attributed to
that decreasing-based algorithms are allocating larger modules
first and save resources to accommodate more requests, and
subsequently lead to higher allocation ratio. Figure 2(b) shows
the residual resources objective function after the allocation is
complete and, similar to the PR case, it exhibits a reduction as
workload increases where the increasing of requested resources
will result in a reduction in spare resources. Furthermore, it
shows that when 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑<0.5 and while PR near 1 for
all algorithms, Best-Fit algorithms (BFD and BF) result in
more RS than their Fist-Fit counterparts (FFD and FF). Best-
fit algorithms utilise resources by selecting locations which
cost the least increase in resource consumption, allowing more
resources to the allocation process, and leading to an increase
in RS that can reach 80% of other algorithms. However, when
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑>0.5 and PR starts dropping, Best-Fit algorithms
still show significant more RS than the rest till all algorithms
reach saturation when workload is beyond 0.8 and no RS is
left to accommodate any more requests.
The second experiment explores the scalability of the
BFD allocation algorithm with different network sizes. We
simulated the placement problem when 𝑝=20 over fat-tree with
𝑘 ∈ {4, 6, 8, 10, 12}. The results of PR and RS metrics for
the BFD algorithms are shown in Figure 3. The two metrics
degrade as workload increases for all networks, however, this
degrading is increasing with network size. This is attributed to
the increase in the number of switches that traffic is distributed
over in each level which results in more duplication and lower
values for PR and RS. However, in the fat-tree architecture,
this increase is reduced in higher network sizes as shown in
𝑘 = 8, 10 and 12.
The third experiment illustrates the scalability of the al-
gorithms with different numbers of module families. PR and
RS are shown in Figure 4 for the BFD algorithm when
𝑝=5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50. PR and RS in Figures 4(a)
and 4(b), respectively, show the scale properties of the BFD
algorithm where identical results for PR are observed in case
of 𝑝>10 and the same for RS. However, for smaller numbers
of module families, for example, when 𝑝=5, PR and RS show
a decrease that can be explained by the sizes of modules being
widely spread and not fit to all available remaining locations
which results in resource fragmentation.
Based on the above results, the BFD algorithm exhibits
better resource utilisation. The Best-fit strategy in the BFD
algorithm reduces the resources consumed by the placement
(a) Placement Ratio (b) Residual Resources
Fig. 4. Placement Ratio and Residual Resources of BFD algorithm when
𝑝=5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 and 𝑘=8
through selecting allocation with minimum duplication and
consequently cause the least increase in resource consumption.
This can be observed in the higher percentage of the objective
function RS when 𝑃𝑅=1. At the same time, the decreasing
order strategy of requests before placement results in increas-
ing the amount of allocated resources in case of 𝑃𝑅<1. This
is demonstrated by the higher value of the second objective
PR relative to the other algorithms. We conclude that the BFD
algorithm optimises both our objectives. Moreover, it scales
well with network sizes and increasing number of modules
families.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of place-
ment of security services over multi-tenant, virtualized DC
infrastructures. We have classified security functions based on
the state keeping requirements of the intrusion detection and
mitigation process. We have formulated the placement problem
to meet both traffic constraints and computational resource
requirements as an instance of the NP-hard VSBPP bin packing
problem. We have defined the residual resources and placement
ratio as the objective functions for the placement, and we have
subsequently formulated the problem in ILP and proposed a
modified version of the Best-Fit Decreasing greedy algorithm
as a polynomial time solution. We have evaluated our approach
against three other algorithms and the ILP solution. The results
have shown that BFD significantly outperforms the other
models up to 80% while satisfying the corresponding traffic
and resource capacity constraints.
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